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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose from respondent's clailn for money
due and O"\V'"ing hin1 for services rendered in designing
plans and specifications for the construction of a home
for appellants on a lot owned by then1 at 1510 Ute Drive
in Indian Hills Subdivision, Salt Lake City, Utah. Respondent's Co1nplaint (R. 1) alleges that in Ap~il of
1954 .appellants engaged his services as an architect and
that coincidentally a \vritten agree1nent \vas executed;
that in pursuance of such e1nployn1ent he entered upon
the preparation and the execution of such necessary
plans, specifications, and dra\Yings, requisite for the
taking of bids by December, 1954; that the lowest hid
\vas $G:2,579.00; that defendants \\rere obligated to pay
a sun1 equal to G% thereof, to-\vit, $3,754.7 ±; that appellants have paid $1300.00 and a balance remains due
and o'ving in the sum of $2,5;)-1:. 7-t, and pray judgment
in that amount.
Appellants' Ans\ver and Counterclaim (R. 3) ad1uits
engaging respondent; denies any written contract was
entered into coincidental with such engagement but adn1its signing a standard form of agreement on the 27th
day of July, 1954, and alleges that said agreement is
incomplete and does not totally .and completely incorporate the agreement of the parties.
By way of counterclaim appellants allege that plain. tiff was engaged hy oral agreement to design a home for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appellants for a cost of work including architectural services and the cost _of th-e land not in excess of $45,000.00;
that on the 27th day of July, 1954, the appellant, Theodore Tahtaras, signed a printed form which is incomplete
and does not fully state the agreement between the
parties ; that the lowest bonafide standing bid which was
presented to appellants was in excess of $80,000.00; that
the respondent did thereafter modify the plans reducing
the size of the proposed structure and did thereupon
receive new bids, the lowest of which was $73,280.00
not inclusive of the cost of the land or the fees of the
architect; that respondent failed in the substantial perforinance of his contract of employment, has failed, refused and neglected to n1odify the plans to the extent
contracted for by the parties and has altogether failed
to perforn1 according to the tern1s of said agree1nent;
that respondent refused to return $1300.00 which appellants had previously paid.
l~espondent's

A1nended Reply (R. 8) alleges the contract in 'vri ting to be the entire .agreen1ent; that appellants orally authorized respondent to design for then1
n residence silnilar in size and ~tyle to respondent's
house .and they approved preliluinary dra\vings as to size
and style of residence: that all prior oral understandings
were reduced to "~ri ting by the execution of the "~ritten
<~on tract on or about J-uly· :27, 1954; tltat there was no
agreen1ent orally or in writing that the total cost of the
honse, inelncli11A' architeetnral services and eo~t of land,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\vas to he a stun not in excess of $45,000.00; that no
fixed 1naximmn was set by the appellants with the respondent in their negotiations; that respondent had
fully perfor1ned; that the bid in the sum of $73,280.00
was in excess o'f the fair and reasonable cost of construction and alleges that the su1n of $1300.00 was paid
pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the contract, which requires
25% of the fee to be paid .at con1pletion of preliminary
sketches.
Appellants denied these allegations.
During trial the Court directed respondent to file
an additional cause in quantum meruit and admitted evidence of estirnates of reasonable costs and the reason.
ahle value of respondent's services, (R. 118, 120, and R.
175, Lns. 1-16).
Respondent's version, as extracted from his testiInony, is substantially:
Appellants were friendly neighbors of the respondent for a period of ten years and are the owners of a
small restaur.ant on West 3rd South Street in Salt Lake
City, comprising 14 stools and 4 booths wherein appellant Theodore Tahtaras works one shift daily as cook
and appellant Josephine Tahtaras works part time as
a w.aitress (R. 152, Lns. 3-16). That respondent knew
this and also that the restaurant was the principal source
of appellants' inco1ne ( R. 164, Ln s. 24-26).
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In April, 1954, he was called to advise appellants
on choice of available lots and in the latter part of the
month (R. 23, 24, Lns. 30-3) he was orally retained to
draw plans and specifications for a dwelling to be built
on the lot of his.reco1nn1endation (R. 143, 144, Lns. 28-2),
the home to be as beautiful, as good and as nice as the
home of the respondent which appellants had visited a
number of times and for which they had repeatedly expressed admiration (R. 25, 26, Lns. 11-11) and which
cost respondent $62,000.00, containing 1100 square feet
of patio (R. 49, Lns. 5-10), 2240 square feet of house,
and 500 square feet of garage (oral stipulation).
Pursuant to such authorization and en1ployment the
respondent on or about May 11, 1954, presented his topographical survey of the property (R.. 27, Lns. 18-21) and
received tl}e instructions (R. 28, Lns. 1-12) fro1n appellants that the house \vas to eontain three bedroon1s
on the 1nain floor, co1nbined living roon1 and dining roon1,
breakfast roon1 off the kitchen, utility roon1 upstairs, a
t\vo-car garage and a co1npleted recreation roon1 do\vn-·
stairs (R. 28, Lns. 1-6) and t\vo bathroo1ns (R. 30, Ijns.
9-13).
In the latter part of ~fay or first part of June lH~
presented -rough sehen1atirs, rough dra,vings to scale
(1~. 29, Lns. 9-17) to appellants (Exhibits 4 and 6) and
reeeived their .acceptance and approval (R. 32, Lns. 2-18)
and ( R. 35, Lns. 1-18).
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At a fourth 1neeting about a week later he presented
these exhibits to appellants again together with a floor
plan to scale (I~xhihit 5) CR. 3-t, Lns. 1-17).
At this n1eeting the schematic sketches and floor
plan, Exhibits 4, 6, and 5 'vere approved by appellants
(R. 35, Lns. 7-27).

On July 27, 1954, .at a fifth Ineeting respondent subInitted preli1ninaries to appellants at their rented residence (R. 36, 37, Lns. 30-1) - prelilninaries being drawings essentially id~ntical with the approved schematics
but in addition had elevation and extensions so that the
appearance of the house could be visualized, Exhibit 7
(R. 37, Lns. 4-28); these 'vere approved and respondent
received frou1 appellants a check for $300.00. On that
date appellant Theodore Tahtaras signed the written
ele1i1ents of the agreement, :mxhibit 1, which is a printed
form prepared by the American Institute of Architects,
and subn1itted by the respondent, which provides:
1. The architect shall prepare plans .and specifications and supervise.
2. Be paid 8% of the Cost of the Work, the said
percentage being.called the Basic Rate, and
3. Receive a su1n equal to 25% of the Basic Rat~
co1nputed upon a reasonable estimated cost upon completion of preliminary studies, and
-t.

Further payrnent fro1n time to tilne so that the
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architect shall have received 75% of the Basic Rate at
the con1pletion of the general working drawings and
specifications.
5. To be computed upon a reasonable cost estimated
-on such completed drawings and specifications or if bids
had been received then computed upon the lowest bona
. fide bid or bids.
6. If any work designed is abandoned or suspended
in whole or in part, the architect should be paid for tl1P.
service rendered on account· of it.

7. Cost of the work is defined as the cost to the
owner, but such cost shall not include any architect's or
special consultant's fees or reiinburseinents or the cost
of the clerk of the work.
At this point respondent could have "guesstimated"
work at something in excess of $60,000.00 but did not
see fit to do so because of the stipulation of designed
work-so1nething as beautiful and as attractive as hi3
home (R. 150, 151, Lns. 1-1).
Nothing in the printed form would indicate its intent to provide for the lilnitation of a proposed cost of
the work and the respondent contends that to this point
there ""as no conversation bet""een the parties \Yhich
deter1nined for hhn such a li1nitation.
About September lOth he subn1itted Exhibit 8,
( whieh are sketches of the interior details, (R. 41, 42.
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I.jns.. 7-1~) and at \vhich tiu1e he conHidered hilnself approved on all items of interior or exterior details (R. 42,
Lns. 23-28) of a house 'vi th a square footage of 4500
Rquare feet (R. 71, Lns. 16-22).
Appellant Josephine Tahtaras volunteered the question that this house \vould cost at least $60,000.00 and
respondent replied , "Yes, at least that and more." (R.
4-l-, 45, I_Jns. 30-13) and appellant Theodore Tahtaras said
in order to give his 'vife exactly what she wanted, he
"rould go as high as $65,000.00 {R. 45, Lns. 1-13).
After this alleged convers.ation respondent pro 7
ceeded to draw final plans and specifications, a procedure \vhich involved the next two months and further
conferences \vith appellants (R. 47, Lns. 2-7) and work
involving Exhibit 17 - working studies and preliminary
engineering, and most of the necessary work prior to
rxecuting the completed documents (R. 72, Lns. 6-18).
l~espondent

testified there was rio conversation about
lilniting the cost of the work other than the one respondent recited .above as having taken place on or about
Neptember 10th ( R. 28, Ln. 28, R. 32, Lns. 2-6, R. 35,
Lns. 28-30, R. 36, Ln. 1, and R. 39, Lns. 24-27).
After co1npleted plans and specifications for a house
of 4500 square feet had bren approved by appellants,
bids \Vere invi ted.
Those received were: (Exhibit 14)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Earl Belknap ················-······-·--·--------$62,589.00
Stewart L. Carlson ------------------------ 80,562.00
I-Iamer Culp Jr. ---------------------------- 82,500.00
A.lvin E. Fors ---------------------------------- 92,500.00
but the bid by Mr. Belknap was immediately withdrawn;
that appellants had no knowledge of Belknap's bid prior
to its withdrawal (R. 67, Lns. 25-29).
Appellants protested the bid prices including the
figure of $62,589.00 (Belknap's bid, R. 73, 74, Lns. 30-7)
and after some discussion respondent offered to revis~
plans, knowing that appellants \Vanted a figure below
$62,589.00, by cutting them to see where they would co1ne
out (R. 72-78, R. 56, Lns. 6-10, R. 153, 154, Lns. 21-2).
That the reasonable estimate of cost is $12 to $14 per
square foot, (R. 174, Lns. 21-23).
With the consent of the appellants to cut plans (R.
72-78, Lns. 25-28) respondent proceeded to cut 700 feet
from the structure ( R. 71, 72, Lns. 16-5) and sent out.
invitations for bids "Tithout first obtaining acceptance
or approval by appellants to the n1odifications (R. 56,
Lns. 11-15 and R. 69, Lns. 17-:2-!) and thereafter subIni tted bids of $73,280.00 and $75,987.00 on the 3800 foot
~trueture to the appellants. At this point respondent 'vas
not asked nor did he offer to rebuild or design new plans
for a house (R. 158, Lns. 1-12).
'

Appellants thereupon abandoned the contract and
returned plans to respondent because they said they \vere
fa(le<l 'vith t\vo la'v suits at the thne and could not conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tinue 'vith construction (R. 1G9, Lns. 15-29).
Appellants had paid a total of $1300.00 in two·p.ayInents (ad1nitted by pleadings).
Appellants' version, as extracted fro1n their testinlony is substantially:
On August 29, 1953, appellants entered into an agree-:
1nent, Exhibit 21, (R~ 238, 239, Lns. 28-8) to purchase
.a lot in Indian Hills, which previously at their request
had been selected for them by respondent, (R. 79, Lns.
17-30 and R. 23, 24, Lns. 11-3). That about the lOth of
June, 1954, after entering into negotiations to sell their
residence, (Exhibit 22) appellants orally contracted with
respondent to design a house on the Ute Drive lot.·
':'Phat appellants and respondent went to the. Ute
Drive lot in Indian Hills (R. 243, Lns. 1-4) and after
appellant Josephine Tahtaras told him the rooms she
\vanted in the house, and their respective locations relating to vie,v, the respondent asked appellant Theodore
Tahtaras how Inuch he ·wanted to spend (R. 270, Lns.
15-21 and R. 243, Lns. 26-30). Appellant Theodore Tahtaras answered, "$40,000 . bec.ause by the time I get
through, the cost of the lot and your fee will run around
$45,000 to $47,500."
In the course of a series of rneetings appellants were
shown and approved various stages of the work, pairl
t\vo installments totalling $1300.00, signed the written
elements of the contract on ,July 27, 1954, and ultimately
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the parties convened in respondent's office on or about
the 14th of December, 1954, at which time appellants observed all the bids and were notified of the withdrawal
of the Belknap bid of $62,589.00. Appellants declared
their disapproval of the size of the bids, and their desire to forget the whole thing (R. 281, 282 Lns. 25-8
and R. 258, Lns. 17-22).
Respondent offered to cut about 500 square feet
(Exhibit 13) to bring amount to appellants' figure (R.
282, Lns. 9-26).
The appellants, at the persuasion of respondent,
consented to cutting the size of house about 500 square
feet; the elimination of a substantial amount of detail
on the lo,ver floor, the cutting of the size of recreation
room, by partitioning off a sewing roon1 and the ad'
dition of one-half bathroo1n
fixtures to a roughed-in
lower floor bathroo1n, Exhibit 11-3R, 4R, 13R (R. 282,
283, Lns. 27-30).
The appellant Theodore Tahtaras called Earl Belknap, the $62,589.00 bidder, and tried to persuade hin1 to
rebid the plans (R. 294, 295, Lns. 22-12) telling hin1 there
1night be son1e revisions (R. 30-!, 305, Lns. 10-10).
When the second bids can1e back respondent talked
to appellant .Josephine rl~nhtaras by phone and on learning the bid~ \vere over $73,000.00 she told hhu they
couldn't afford it and would be better off 0a-oin()'
out to
0
buy one.
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The arehi teet ans\vPred, ·'I think you'd better." (R.
260, Lns. 15-25).
Appellants deny specifically that they participated
in a ·conversation at any tin1e where 1frs. Tahtaras had
estiniated building costs at $GO,OOO or that Mr. Tahtaras
had declared a \\rillingness to spend $65,000 (R. 279,
I~ns. 3-19).
That about the 1niddle of January, 1955, appellant
rrheodore Tahtaras, in the office of respondent, discussed
the second set of bids \vhich \V(·re $73,280.00 and $75,987.00 (R. 286, 287, Lns. 30-15) and appellant told hiin
to forget the \vork. Respondent ans,vered, "I can't build
you a ho1ne for less than $GO,OOO.OO," and demanded th~
halance of his fee.
Appellant refused to pay (R. 288, Lns. 1-4) and on
.January 26, 1955, bought ·a home already constructed. ·
~~~he

Court in line \vith it~ reasoning expressed at
the trial ( 1~. 320, Lns. 3-8) made its decision (Minute
Entry - R. 3~-!) ; holding defendant e1nployed plaintiff
to design plans for .a figure of $65,000 less architect's
fees or $G0,18G.18; "plaintiff could have cut plans to get
hids of this figure, but defendant abandoned project.
])efendants not entitled to return of any fees paid; plain ..
tiff entitled to judgment calculated on quantum meruit"
and con1puted the saine as followR:
"Fee if work had been completed 8% of
62,579.00 is 5207.12 reduced to maxiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mum of 8% on 60,185.18 or.................... 4814.82
Less tt4 allocated to building superviSion ··---------·······-.. ------.. ----.. ----------------------·-----·· 1203.70
Less Ys allocated to reducing plans to
secure bids at 60,185.18............................ 601.85
Less amount paid ------------····---------·------·-···-·· 1300.00
1709.27
(R. 324)."
Findings (R. 13 and 14) were made that appellants
engaged respondent to draw plans and specifications for
a home the cost of the work to be $65,000 including
architect's fees or $60,185.18; that the \vritten contract
did not fully encompass all of the understandings and
contracts made by the parties; that bids were taken by
plaintiff for the convenience of the defendants, the said
bids ranging fro1n $73,500 to $90,000, -but plaintiff \va-s
ready, willing and able to reduce the dimensions and
design so as to procure bids of $60,185.18; that not,vithstanding the willingness and ability of plaintiff to
further 1nodify the drawings and specifications, defendants on January 14, 1955, notified plaintiff of their intention to abandon, and they did in fact abandon their
projected construction and did not erect the residence
designed by plaintiff or any residence on said lot; that
the reasonable v.alue of plaintiff's services is $3009.27 and
plaintiff is entitled to that su1n less $1300.00 paid or a
balance of $1709.27 \vhich sun1 \Va~ payable on or before February 1, 1955.
Appellants 1noved for a ne\V trial (R. 328) and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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said 1notion "\vas denied (R. 329).
STA~rENIENT

OF POINTS
POINT I.

DURING TRIAL THE COURT ERRED IN (a) INTRODUClNG THE ISSUE OF QUANTUM MERUIT; (b) PERMITTING EVIDENCE TO BE ADiviiTTED IN SUPPORT
THEREOF; (c) ALLOWING AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT; (d) MAKING FINDING NO. 7 THAT REASONABLE VALUE OF RESPONDENT'S SERVICES IS $3009.27;
(e) ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON; (f) DENYING APPELLANTS RECOVERY OF THE SUM OF $1300.00.

POINT II.
THE COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT THE COST OF
THE WORK HAD BEEN STIPULATED AT THE INCEPTION
OF THE ORAL CONTRA.CT, ERRED IN FINDING THE
FIGURE WAS $60,185.18 AS SET FORTH IN FINDINGS
OF FACT NUMBERED 4 AND 6 RATHER THAN THE SUM
OF $40,000.00 AS TESTIFIED TO BY APPELLANTS.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING (a) THAT THE
BIDS TAKEN BY THE PLAINTIFF RANGED FROM $73,500 TO $90,000 AND (b) THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS
READY WILLING AND ABLE TO CUT THE PLANS TO
$60,185.18.

POINT IV.
AN ARCHITECT OWES TO HIS ·CLIENT A FIDUCIARY
DUTY OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH.

POINT V.
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE ·CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF
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THE COURT.; TO THE CONTRARY, THE SAID FINDINGS
REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLANTS ON THEIR A~ISVvER AND. COUNTERCLAIM. WE SUBMIT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE
OF ACTION SHOULD BE ENTERED ON PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT AND FOR APPELLANTS ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM.

1\RGUl\fENT
POINT I.
DURING TRIAL THE COURT ERRED IN (a) INTRODUCING THE ISSUE OF QUANTUM MERUIT; (b) PERMITTING EVIDENCE TO BE ADMITTED IN SUPPORT
THEREOF; (c) ALLOWING AMENDMENT OF THE COlVIPLAINT; (d) MAKING FINDING NO. 7 THAT REASONABLE VALUE OF RESPONDENT'S SERVICES IS $3009.27;
(e) ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON; (f) DENYING APPELLANTS RECOVERY OF THE SUM OF $1300.00.

(a) .and (c) violate
Civil Procedure.

R~ule

15 (h) of lTtah Rules of

(b) Ad1nission of testimony in support of a cause
1n quantun1 1ueruit is i1n1naterial and irrelevant 'vhere
it is in defeasanee of the tern1s of an express contract.
(d) The 1neasure of respondent's dan1ages in quantuJn 1ueruit is set forth in the court's decision (R. 8:2-l:).
Thr. court first Inultiplied $60,185.00 "rhich it had
detern1ined to be the pre-stated li1nitntion on the cost
of the \YOrk by the contr.actural Basic R.a.te, nalnely s:;~.

It thPn reduced this result by

1/~

because of build--
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ing suspension, and an additional Vs 'vhich was allocated
as the reasonable value of the work necessary in reducing the plans further to secure bids consistent with
the pre:.stated limitation.
This conclusion j s not merely not borne out by
the evidence in that the ljg reduction is absolutely arbitrary- \vithout a scintilla of evidence to support it- but
is in direct conflict with respondent's contention that he
"exceeded in service value 1nore than the contract
a1nount" (R. 176, Lns. 10-26).
Counsel 1nost seriously questions the prerogative of
the court summarily to evaluate the failure of respondent's performance to Ys of his fee.
Even if this Vs was amenable to 1neasurement, the
crux of the issue here is \vhether the performance of
respondent is to be 1neasured by his work at the dra,ving
hoard, or hy the substantive result of his cutting an additional 1000 feet ($12.00-$14.00 per foot, see Statement
of Facts) front the size of the house regardless of the
desires of the appellants.
(e) Judgment in quantum meruit in this case is contrarY" to law. Both parties insisted an express contract
existed between them, and the court so found.
By the court's st.aten1ent- (R. 118, 119, 120):
COURT: "It is my idea right now in the case
you have to recover on the quanturn meruit. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It looks like now I would think quantum meruit
would be your basis, in other words reasonable
value to date, not exceeding probably a certain
sum-"
MR. ROSE: I take it Your Honor feels there
is a basis for recovery in this action on quantum
meruit~

COURT: I think if there is any it would be
on tltat basis. If the contract had been perfor1ned
it probably \vould not be the basis for recovery.
- We have the plaintiff's story- That they were
stopped in the middle of their work, and when
that occurs quantum meruit is usually the basis
for damages, not the amount of the contract -"
Counsel for appellants disagrees. If respondent can
recover at all, he n1ust do so on the express contract
made by the parties. He eannot, where he has failed to
perform, or been guilty of breach, avail hin1self of the
device of quantun1 n1eruit to recover for his unused and
unuseable efforts. One who breaches an express contract should not be per1nitted to circun1vent his responsibilities thereunder or avoid the onus of hi~ breaeh, but
retain its benefits through the 1uediun1 of iluplied contract.
Where there is an express contract nothing is to be
i1nplied, except as n1ay be construed fro1n the agree1nents
expressed.
It follows that if respondent is not entitled to
reeover on quantun1 IHPtuit, he cannot r~tnin the $1300.00
paid hiln by the appellants.
(f)
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In Jfaack v. Schneider- 57 ~[o. App. 431 where
$200.00 had been paid on aecount to the architect, the
court declared at Page 433:
"If this be true it is difficult to see - the
plaintiff had any rause of action .against the defendant. Taking plaintiff's evidence to be true,
it left plaintiff in receipt of $200.00 to which he
had no legal claim."
If respondent's version of the transaction between
hin1 and appellants is to be believed, and if under the
circtnnstances he \vas entitled to a recovery in quantun1
1neruit, then he could conceivably recover for work only
to the date of Septe1nber lOth when, according to hiln,
appellants committed themselves to an expenditure up
to $65,000. He could not recover for work thereafter
which was (respondent's testimony) - "The procedure
\Vhich involved additional conferences with appellants
(1~. 47, Lns. 2-7) and work involving Exhibit 17 which
is working studies .and preliminary engine~ring and most
of the necessary work prior to executing the completed
docun1ents" (R. 72, I_jns. 6-18) and also the completed
documents.
This work led to bids in excess of $80,000. There is
no evidence of the value of respondent's work to that date
and therefore he must fail of recovery.
The follo,ving cases elearly support appellants'
position: In Pack v. Wines (l'"tah 1914) 141 Pac. 105
Justice Straup in his concurring opinion on page 107
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declares:
"But since he made a bid 'vhich 'vas not
satisfactory and not acceptable to the defendants,
therefore he asserts he now is entitled to be paid.
But that is not his contract. No such condition is
specified or embraced within it. 'Vhen the parties,
as here, made a contract specifying conditions
under which the plaintiff was to receive no conlpensations, and conditions under which he was
to be paid, to no"\v permit him to recover on other
conditions not specified is to make another con~
tract for the1n, or to permit a recovery on an ilnplied contract. I think we may do neither.
In Graham v. Bell Irving (1907 Wash.) 91 Pac. 8, Plaintiff architect was to receive a fee eqllal to 2¥2 percent
of the lo,vest or accepted bid, as the case nright be, for
services silnilar to those of respondent in the instant
case. A cost of construction lilnit was stip-ulated at
$25,000 but the lowest bid was $35,000. Defendant counterclaimed for $300 paid prior to the receipt of the bid.
The court declared :

.

......

"lTnder such facts there 'vas a plain failure
to prepare plans that 'vould con1e \Yithin the liinitations of the construction cost fixed by respondent, a straight breach of the contract. Appellant
is therefore not entitled to recover upon the contract, and he is no n1ore entitled to recover upon
a quantun1 1neruit. Respondent has neither aceepted nor received any benefits fron1 appellant's
work, and he offered to fully return the plans.
It is argued that the respondent~s payn1ent of
$:~00.00 on aceount of thP plans ::uuounted to an
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IN THE SUPREr\1E COURT OF THE STArr'E OF UfJ.\\H

LOWELL E. PARRISH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsTHEODORE H. TAHTARAS, and
JOSEPHINE T.~HTA RA.S,
Defendants and Appellants.

-----------------------------

:
INSERTION OF
: .ADDITIONAL illJCOVERED CASES
: ON BEHALF OF

APPELLANTS.
:Case No. 8514

The following two cases are to be inserted
on Page 19 of Appellants' 3rief immediately
following quotation from Pack v. Wines (Utah
1914) in support of appellants' proposition
as set forth in Point I

of the said Brief.

In Morris· v. Russell, et ux 120 Utah 546;

236 Pacific (2nd) 451, Mr. Crockett declares
as dictum:
"It may be true that where parties
allege the same express contract,
it is improper to submit the case
to the jury on quantum meruit."

...
Taylor v. Royle 1 Utah (2nd) 175
Deals primarily with the matter of quantum
meruit proof where the complaint alleged an
express contract employment, and the Court
decided that it was improper to have awarded
a quantum meruit judgment.
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acceptance. ']~he pa)ylnent was n1ade before it had
been de1nonstrated by the bids that the planR
would not n1eet the require1nents of the contract
in the rnatter of cost· of construction. It was a
vayn1ent rnade upon account, somewhat hastily
perhaps, but undPr the eiretnnstances it was not
an act 'vhich hound respondent to an acceptance
of the plans."
The court further held that sinee appellee. did not
appeal for return of the $300.00 it would not rule on
the n1atter.
In Kurfiss v. Jf nrtin 110 S. W. 33 nlissouri 1908 in the
syllabus note 2 on page 32, the court declare.d :·
"22.

San1e -·Quantum Meruit.

"An .arehitect agreeing to furnish plans for
a building, the cost not to exceed a specified
. a1noun·t,. who fails to co1nply 'vith his contract,
in that the building would cost in excess of that
a1nount, is not entitled to recover on a quantum
meruit."

And further at the hotto1n of the second colun1n on page
33, declares:
"~Judging

by defendant's contention, he is
laboring under the supposition that the court tried
the case upon the theory that, although plaintiff
had failed to comply with his contract in the first
instance, he would Le entitled to recover on quanturn n1eruit for the services rendered under the
contraet. lf this supposition is true, ·the court
was in error. A party c.annot recover for the
reasonable value of his services rendered in
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cases of contracts of this kind unless he had hiinself complied with its terms."
In Cooper v. City of Derby 75 Atl. 140 (Conn. 1910) the
Court stated on Page 141, column 1:
"He therefore could not complain that they
were not accepted. Nor can he recover upon a
quantum meruit. No plans were wanted, or would
have been of service, 'vhich called for n1ore money
than the co1nmittee could contract to pay. His did.
The limit of cost 'vas brought to his attention first
by the board of education, and then by the coinrnittee. His estilnates, submitted to them in response, proved to be incorrect. .Lt\..n architect enlployed to plan a building to c.ost $20,000, does not
fulfill the terms of his engagement by planning
one that costs $30,000. His employer may be
ready to incur the additional expense, and to 1nake
use of the plans. He may also decline to make
any use of then1. This the city did in the case at
bar."

Zannoth v. Booth Radio Stations 52 N. \V·. (2d) 678
(1\fieh. 1952) states on l:>age 682:
" (2, 3) It is the rule in I\!ichigan that an
architect 1nust stay "Tithin the cost set by the
o'vner, even though such co8t "Tas not set out in
the written contract bet,veen the parties.''
This case is 1uore fully discussed later in this brief.
In II elln11.tth v. Benoist 129 S. \V·. 257 (~Iissouri 1910)
in a sinlilar type of <'H8t~ the court in denying the architect
rPeovPry on a quantun1 1ueruit in the second colunm of
page 258 stated :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
"Contention is u1.ade by plaintiff that this is
an action upon quantu1n 1neruit for services rendered. While this is true as far as the amount of
his recovery is coneerned, yet his pleading asserts a contract of en1ploy1nent which was cornplete except as to the price to be paid; his contention being that the payn1ent for the services
to be rendered \vas to be their reasonable v.alue,
and \vas not dependent upon any condition. The
contention of defendant is that the contract of
elnploynlent was conditioned that he should
furnish plans for a house not to cost rnore than
$10,000, and that this being the contract, and plaintiff having failed to furnish plans for such a
house, he cannot recover. It see1ns clear to us that
this testilnony as to \vhat the terms of the contract \vere \vas admissible· under a general denial.
It does not assert a different employment or a
different contract from that pleaded by plaintiff,
but it was offered for the purpose of showing
that the contract pleaded by plaintiff was never,
in fact made, and hence goes to defeat plaintiff's
cause of action entirely."

POINT II.
THE ·COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT THE COST OF
THE '\VORK HAD BEEN STIPULATED AT THE INCEPTION
OF THE ORAL CONTRACT, ERRED IN FINDING THE
FIGURE WAS $60,185'.18 AS SET FORTH IN FINDINGS
OF FACT NUMBERED 4 AND 6 RATHER THAN THE SUM
OF $40,000.00 AS TESTIFIED TO BY APPELLANTS.

Appellants contend that at the time of engaging
the services of respondent he asked and they told him
the)· \Vere 'villing to spend $40,000 for construction; that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
they figured to spend $45,000 to $47,000, including
architect's fee and cost of the land.
Respondent contend's he was engaged under a
stipulation of the designed "rork-son1ething as beautiful
and as attractive as his ho1ne (R. 150, Lns. 18-25) -and
not· until 41j2 months after he was engaged under that
stipulation and had received approval and acceptance
·.of his work in both interior and exterior detail did one
-appellant volunteer a guess on. the cost of the construc·tiori, and the other volunteer a cornmittn1ent on what he·
!vould spend; namely $65,000; that tllis committment ''Tas
_1nad~ six>\veeks after appellants l1ad. signed the 'vritten
portion .of the contract.
.

•

I,

The Court at close of trial declared: (R. 320, Lns.
3-8):
''It is very apparent that a person listening
to the evidence would find it hard to i1nagine that
the plaintiff would do all of the work he did, without being told as to 'vhat price range he was to
·do· it in. It is also hard for a person to ilnagine
that the defendant would hire an architect to do
such work without giving hiln a price range."
The Decision ( R. 32-l-) and Findings (R. 13 and 1-1)
strike a con1pro1nise to thr effect that a lhnitation 8perifying the inclusion of the n rchitect's fee "·.as set before the
work \Vas begun (but not the cost of the land) and deterInine thP figure to be the one recited hy the architect
aH having been stipulated 4% 1nonths later.
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The finding see1ns obviously inconsistent in that it
seeks to reconcile the irreconcilable.
If it \Vas the opinion of the court that a lin1itation
was made at the very outset, then it can only be the
figure contended for by .appellants, for appellants' iR
the only figure testified to at this ti1ne.
A contract must be construed from the perspective
of the parties at the tin1e of entering into the contract
and if one contends for one unusual in the common experience of n1an, then he n1ust prove such a contract
clearly and convincingly.

CoornlJs v. Beede, 1896, 89 1\le. 187, 36 A. 104 56 A1n.
St. Rep. 406 declares:
"Of course, it would be too much to say that
parties could not make such a shadowy contr.act
as the defense contends for, but it would be so
strange and unusual a thing to do, that clear and
convincing evidence should be required to prove

•t "

l .

:\ denial of appellant's testin1ony, and the propounding of respondent's story, which in and of itself is unusual, is hardly such cle.ar and convincing proof. It
seen1s hardly reasonable that at the time of entering into
the \vritten portion of the agree1nent, at which tilne the
floor plan and perspectives had been con1pleted by the
respondent and approved by the appellants (the point
'vhere the minds of the parties Inet on the size and the
uppe.arance of the house} the appellants \vould not have
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expressed some curiosity about the cost of the house.
It is much more likely that they would not have bound
themselves to the written terms unless they knew a prestipulated cost limitation was in1pressed upon it.
At the point where respondent presented the written
form for signature, it was incumbent upon him to have
informed the appellants of his "guesstimate." It is
probable that he did not do so because he was aware of
the cost li1nitation imposed upon hin1, and intended to
abide it.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING (a) THAT THE.
BIDS TAKEN BY THE PLAINTIFF RANGED FROM $73,500 TO $90,000 AND (b) THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS
READY WILLING AND ABLE TO CUT THE PLANS TO
$60,185.18.

The best argtnnent supporting Point III is responden'ts own testimony:
(a) and (b) The bids received
after first invitation
#
to bid were : $62,589.00; $80,562.00; $82,500.00 ~ $92,500.00
(Exhibit 1±) and the $62,589.00 bid \\Tas withdra,vn before appellants were infor1ned of it. (R. 67, Lns. 25-29).
J?lans 'vere cut 700feet in size, .a substantial a1nount
of dPtail 'vas eliluinated and bids returned at $73,280.00
and $75,987.00. By a ronsistent course of conduct established by respondent's repeated submission to appellants
of the plans during their various forn1a tiYe stages and
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the approval .and acceptance by ~hem of the san1e, the
parties determined respondent's performance to be a set
of plans specific in size and detail at a stipulated price.
'ralid hids for the construc-tion of this house ranged
fron1 $80,5G2.00 to $92,500.00.
Respondent kno\ving appellants' desire to spend a
figure less than $62,500.00 offered to cut plans to see
\vhere they \vould cou1e out. He cut, but plans didn't
co1ne out even close to .appellants' known desires in price
(R. 72-78):

"Q. And you assumed the responsibility then of
shrinking this house to get a substantial cut
on the figure of $62,500 did you not~
A.

The $62,500 figure \vas out of the total. It
\vasn't on any figures. It was a resubmittal
on the basis of reduced size of drawings.

Q. And you suggested that you revise it to cut
do\vn under the $62,500 figure~
- 1\.

I did not suggest I do that at all. I suggested
I cut the drawings - cut out the amount of
building and see where it would come in at.

Q.

-y· ou knew, however, they wanted the figure
of $62,500 cut, did you not~

A.

Yes, they said that, but you cannot al\vays
take a client at his word. He always wants
to save money.

TIIE COURT: Mr. Parrish, you knew they wanted sornething less than $62,500 ~
A. I didn't promise they could have it.
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THE COURT: In view of what they said about
the size of the bid~
A.

I knew they would want it for as little as
they could get it.

THE COURT: You knew they wanted it for less
than $62,500.
A. I don't know, you would have to ask the1n."
(R. 72-78)

At a conference between all of the parties after the
bids of $73,280 and $75,987 had been received: (R. 158,
Lns. 5-12)

"Q. In any case you refused to redesign the house
that 'vould bring then1 (the costs)

A.

down~?

I did not refuse, I was not asked, but I did
not refuse.

Q. I am asking you did you offer to rebuild or
redesign the new plans for a house.
A.

I did not offer."

Despite this testin1ony the court found respondent
ready, willing and able to cut plans.
POINT I\T.
AN ARCHITECT OWES TO HIS ·CLIENT A FIDUCIARY
DUTY OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH.

This staten1ent in Paln1er rs. Bro·zcn et al. 273 Pae.
(2d) 306 (Cal. 1954) states succinctly a principle of la'v
irresponsibly violated hy respondent. Respondent undertook to design a house for a husband and .n \vife ,vho
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(respondent kne\v) O\vned a 14-stool 4-booth restaurant
in \vhich hushand \vorked one shift daily as a cook, the
\vife \vorked part ti1ne as a \vaitress and which \Vas the
principal source of incon1e for them.
]{(·svondent elai1ns no greater stipulated lilnitation
upon hin1 than '"as heautiful and as attr.active as his
hou1e. '' In perforn1ing his function the respondent
created neither silnilar size, cost, quality, nor silnilar de~ign. ll1s testintony denies any effort to reproduce
sin1ilar size, eost, or design. (R. 92-96) Similar quality
is refuted by the fact that his own house cost $17 - $20
per square foot whereas he testified to $12 - $14 per
square foot as the estimated cost of the ho1ne designed
for the appellants.
There can be no doubt that respondent knew of his
failure of performance in terrn~ of cost limitation, because upon receiving the first bids he undertook to cut
the size of the plans at least one week prior to informing
appellants of thern (R. 152, Lns. 23-28). With the consent of the appellants to cut plans, knowing their dissatisfaction \vith the figure of $62,500, respondent with
a total disregard of their expressed dissatisfaction "cut
the plans to see \vhere they \vould come out" because
'"you cannot al\v.ays take a client at his \Vords; he always
\vants to save 1noney." (R. 61, Lns. 11-14).
Respondent further ignored the responsibility of his
fiduriary relationship \vhen after cutting 700 feet from
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the size of the first-agreed -upon dwelling, eliminating
substantial detail and rnaking 1nodifications on the basement layout, he did not see fit to submit these to. appellants for their approval. Yet in every formulative stage
of his work prior to this he considered it a part of liis
responsibility to seek their approval and acceptance. lie
excuses himself because of the pressure of time yet he
did not feel pressed to notify appellants of the receipt
of bids for a period of at least a \Veek after their receipt.
Respondent further disregarded the responsibility of
his trust \vhen he did not see fit to caution appellant~
of the probable cost at the ti1ne he sought to bind then1
to a \Vritten contract and at which time he could have
"g·uesstiln.ated" its cost to be in excess of $60,000.
In response to questioning \Yhy he did not caution
the1n he ans,vered (R. 150, Lns. 22-25)
''A.

Caution ·w·as not the \Yord required. I did
not caution the1n and I did not feel it was
incumbent upon 1ne to caution the1n, because
the stipulations of designed work, something
as attractive and as beautiful as 1ny ho1ne-"

POINT,....
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT; TO THE CONTRARY, THE SAID FINDINGS
REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLANTS ON THEIR ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM. WE SUBMIT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
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SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE
OF ACTION SHOULD BE ENTERED ON PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT AND FOR APPELLANTS ON THEIR COUNTERCLAil\f.

The gener.al proposition of la'v relating to the payment of architect's fees where the bid exceeded the
architect's estilnate or the o\vner's limitation is stated
\vith approbation in ll'illiar v. Nagle, et al, (Md. 1908
71 Atl. 427. An excerpt, as it applies fully in point to
the instant case, declares:
"6 Cyc. 30, 'that a person employed as an
architect to furnish a plan is entitled to remuneration therefor, if made in accordance with the directions of the owner ; but he cannot recover
where the owner stipulates that the plan should
be for a building not to cost over a specified
~unount, if the plans made are for .a building exceeding that su1n. If the cost of erecting a building- is "reasonably near" or "reasonably approxiInates" (as son1e of the authorities express it)
that stated in the esti1nate or understanding of
the parties, the owner might very properly be
held liable, certainly in many cases, for he knows
or as a man of ordinary intelligence may be presumed to know, that there 1nay be some slight
variance between the estilna te and the actual cost
of the building. Feltham v. Sharp, 99 G. 260,
25 S. E. 619; Nelson v. Spooner, 2 Foster & Finlason, 613; Walt on Eng. and Arch. Juris., Supra.
Ordinarily that question should be submitted to
the jury, unless there be a written contract which
has to be entirely construed by the court and has
no provision in it which should be submitted to
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the jury; but in a case like this, 'vhere it was contended that the building to be erected was not
to exceed $90,000, while the lowest bid was $125,000, the court could declare as a matter· of la\v
that the estimate did not reasonably approxilnate
the cost, which the lo\ver court in effect did in
granting the defendant's first and third prayers.
In addition to the authorities above referred to,
· see 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, -818, Maack v.
Schneider, 57 1Io. App. 431, W ees v. W.arren,
72 1io. App. 644, Ada St. ~I. E. Church v. Garnsey, 66 Ill. 132, I-!all v. Los Angeles Co., 74 Cal.
502, 16 Pac. _313, Smith v. Dickey, 74 Tex. 61,
11 · S ..\V. 1049, and 1 IIudson on Bldg. 70, al-.
tho_ugh so1ne of them do not discuss the question
fully."
·
X. ,-v. (2d)
678~ .(Mich. -1952) previously referred
to \\Tith relation
.
to quantum 1neruit, is particularly pertinent in that the
contract is identical to the one in the in~tant ease. The
circu1nstanees are equally identical in that the \vritten
elernents of the contract \vere signed after the architect
had begun his work. In this case the eourt denied re ·
co very on the con tract, der laring: On pg. 683, Notes 5

Za1i.Jiotlv v. Booth Rad·io Stations,

5~

.•

and 6
"Plaintiff having bre.aehed the contract as
hereafter will be sho,vn, and defendant -receiving no benefit 'vhatsoever fron1 Plaintiff's perforinance thereof after Septe1nber 1~t by reason
of. such breach, quanttun n)eruit is not proper.
Recovery cannot be had on a quantum n1eruit by
a person \Vho breaehed the rontr.act against one
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reeeiving no benefit from the performance o'f the
services for which recovery is sought. The trial
court did not err.
The trial court also ruled that Plaintiff had
breached the contract and could recover nothing
thereon by reason of his exceeding the cost limitation on the building."
lVetzel v. Roberts 295 N. \V. 580 (Mich. 1941) dealIng \vith the same type of contract and circumstances
resulting fro1n a bid in excess of the oral limitation,
calls attention to the fact that no contract for the construction of the building was ever executed and denied
recovery to the architect, declaring:
"In spite of obscurity and contradiction, it
.appears that the architect's fees are based upon
a percentage, to be computed upon the cost of
the work and the cost of the work is to be based
on the amount specified in the executed construction contract.
In this case no contract for the construction
\vork \vas ever executed. When Roberts received
the bid on the plans prepared by plaintiff, it
amounted to $28,000. This was so much greater
than the amount that he had planned upon, and
so in excess of the lilnitation of expense which
was co1nmunicated by Heartt to Wetzel, that
Roberts refused to go ahead with the proposition.
1-Le later remodeled the building according to another plan. Plaintiff sued for· 6 per cent of a fee
based upon 10 per cent of the bid of $28,000 clailning that such sum w-as due him under the contract.
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tJ•

·(l) There is nothing in the terms of the con-·
tract which provides that the total fee of the
architect would be 10 per cent of the amount
of a bid. The .fee depends upon the letting of
a contract. The architectural fees were based
upon the total amount that it would cost to do
the work, according to the terms of the construction contract. Apparently the form of contract
here used was drafted to cover a case where the
owner actually let a building contract; but it did
not cover the case before u~, where no building
contract was ever executed. To sustain the clann
of plaintiff it would be necessary to hold that no
· matter how. large. the bid for doing the work,
Roberts would have been obligated to pay an
architectural fee based upon the amount of such
a ·bid. The contract does not so provide, and
Roberts did not so agree.

(2) Furthermore, it appears that there was
an oral condition precedent to the execution of
the contract. Plaintiff had been advised before
he com1nenced to prepare the plans and specifications that the cost of the ilnprove1nents 'vas not
to exceed $15,000. In this regard it is of no consequence 'vhether Heartt, 'Yho infor1ned Wetzel
of this lhnitation, 'vas the agent of· plaintiff or
of Roberts. The evidence shows that, after being
advised of the lhnitation, plaintiff drafted the
plans and that there "Tas no subsequent modification of this condition precedent.

' r·

We cite additionally TV·icks v. i.1lu rphy, 54_ N.
(2d) 850, and The Royal Order of Moose v. Faulhaber,
41. N. W. (2d) 535, both recPnt Michigan c.ases and ''re
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earnestly request their reading by the court in that the
entire opinion deals probatively with the la'v subject,
but are too long to repeat here.
The citation of 127 ALR, 4-10 covers comprehensively
the entire subject citing n1any 1nore cases dealing with
the subject and revealing overvvheln1ingly the foregoing
to be the general tenor of opinion.
In the case .at bar the court, however, interjected
the concept that the architect had avoided the onus of
his failure to perform the contract by being ready, willing and able to cut plans to the agreed figure. The only
support appellant can find for this doctrine is the last
sentence in Section 15 of Architects at 3 Am. J ur. 1009 :.
"A similar rule applies where the architect
is able and willing to make such alterations, but
the en1ployer refuses to allow him to do so."
The citation given in support of it is the hereinbefore
cited Coo1nbs v. Beede, 89 ~fe. 187; 36 A. 104; 56 An1.
St. Rep. 406:
"Plaintiff, architect employed by defendant
to build a house for $1500.00. The \vife wanted a
second story and $2500.00 was set as limit, based
on architect's actual estilnates. He then dre\v
plans and then said he thought house would cost
over $2500.00 and wife said cut it down. It was
so done.
"Bids were sent out and ranged from $3300.00
to $4400.00 and then to $3100.00. Defendant reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fused to accept and refused to pern1it plaintiff to
cut down plans. Plaintiff advised wait until
spring and she accepted the advice, for building
costs to come down.
"Defendant did not wait, he bought his o'vn
material and hired labor by the day, from 1nemory
and experience drew sketch for carpenter and
with him erected house and stable, substantially
as plans. The house alone for a little less than
$2700.00.
"So that plaintiff's calculations tested by
actual cost instead of contractor's bids were less
than $200.00 of variance fro1n the standard "rhich
·the. defendant and wife pretend was prescribed
for by them. Even if A's version be true, then the
undertaking of plaintiff was to make plans for a
house to cost $2500.00 and no n1ore: and if acting
in good faith, he exercised his skill and ability
in an endeavor to bring about that result, that is
all that could be -expected or required of hnn:
and no defense is established against his clann
even if he failed in his atte1npt. But if the house
designed by hin1 could be built for less than $2,700.00 it could hardly be call~d a failure, especially in view of the interferences on the part
of defendant's 'vife ~ nor a f.ailure if the plaintiff could have so altered his plans as to reduce
the house in price, and it seems preposterous to
say that he could not: and he was "illing to 1nake
alterations, and the defendant or his 'Yife 'vould
not consent thereto.''
It is interesting to note that An1erican Jurisprudence
1s the only ene:vrlopedic leg.al authorit~~ dignifying
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Coontbs v. Beede in its text.

]{eferenc-es to the case have been 1nade in notes and
footnotes as follo,vs :
~'42

LRA N.S. 127 Note: '"\Vhile the decision
in Coo1nbs v. I~eede, 89 ~'le. 187, 36 Atl. 104, is
correct upon the evidence in the case, the opinion
leaves so1nething of clearness to be desired.' "
"5 CJ 262 Footnote re this case says : 'But
the decision in this case 1nay perhaps be supported on the ground th.at some use was made
of the architect's plans or suggestions.' "
.L~merican

I..4aw Reports (companion piece to A1n .
•Jur.) at 127 ALR 412 Col. 2 states:
''Attention is called to Coombs v. Beede which
appears out of harmony with the general rule.lt is submitted that the opinion in the above case
leaves something of a clearness to be desired."
The syllabus to the Am. Sts. Rep. citation of the case
declares in effect that the reason for the decision is the
house v.ras actually built for less than $200.00 in excess
of the stipulated figure.
Appellant cannot argue that Coombs v. Beede is not
good law as related to its particular facts, but feels a
significance in the fact that despite the numerous adjudications relative to architects' fees since Coombs v.
Beede was reported in 1898, its doctrine has never to
the kno,vledge of appellants' counsel been followed or
even argued in support of its doctrine of tender of perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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formance.
Indeed, to apply it to the instant case \Vould be violative of the cardinal principles ernployed in construing
contracts, for it would be permitting the unilateral discretion of the architect limited only by a cost figur~
to deterrnine the appearance, the size and the structure
of the house regardless of the desires of the proposed
owner. So arbitrary is such a concept that it destroys
the element of rnutuality in contracts.
To construe the c~ntract of the parties here to rnean
that respondent .as an architect could approach a set of
plans on a hit or miss basis until he n1et an agreed figure,
with the unrestricted option to cut "There he will in size
and quality, and that appellants conten1plated and agreed
to such a contract with such a n1eaning is to violate an
uncontrovertible principle of the law in that it introduces
an optional performance on the part of the respondent.
The law frowns on construing a contract to be an
option where there is no clear intent of the parties to do
so and particularly where such a construction would entail no responsibility, but only benefit to one of the
parties.
Yet this is apparently the theory of the trial judge
for in his sun1n1ation (R. 320, Ln. 23 and follo,ving):
"'MR. ROSE: ~fay I ask a question, your
Honor?
''How about the element of his performance
of contract-even if you "Trr~ to find $62,500 \vas
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38·
the lin1it, isn't there .a question as to 'vhether or
not he had substantially performed, even if that
"\Vas the limit~
~'T I-IE

COlJRT : I do not think so. lJnder ~~r r.
Parrish's testin1ony, he figured that he would get
the plans close enough to it, so a revision would
bring it within that range, and he was stopped
in his efforts.
"His theory is supported by his testimony
that he was stopped in his efforts at getting a
ho1ne in the range of $60,000, bec.a.use they decided
that they did not want to go through "\Vith it."
In A1nerican Locomotive Co. v. Clve1nical Research
Cor]J., 171 I~.,. (2cl) 115, (1954) the Court declares at l~age

128:
"This Court said in ~Iidland Linseed Products Co. v. Charles I~. Sargent Co., 6 Cir., 281 F.
704, at page 708 - 'It is a canon of construction
that courts will not destroy the mutual and reciprocal obligations of the contracting parties, .and
suhstitute therefor an optional contract, unless
the language used ilnperatively requires such
construction.' "
In Wilson & English Canst. Co. v. New York C. R.
Co., 269 N.1~.S. 877 (1935 ), the Court declares as rules
of construction :
"(3) Words intended to exempt a party
from liability because of its own fault are to be
construed strictly against it.
" ( 4) A contract "\vill not be so construed
aR to put one party at the mercy of the other.
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Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N.Y. 549, 55 N.E.
292."
v. Jensen, 63 Utah 94; 222 Pac. 598 (1924 Utah)
cites with approval Frick, J., in B'ltrt v. Stringfellou·,
45 Utah 207, 143 Pac. 234 as follows:
[J dy

"In case parties have entered into a contrart
and differ with regard to its Ineaning, and the
terms .of the contract are doubtful or ambiguous,
the first duty of the court is to ascertain the actual intention of the parties at the time the contract was entered into. This intention 1nust be
determined from the language used by the parties
when applied to the subject-matter of the contract
and the circumstances and conditions surrounding
the parties. In arriving at a conclusion all the
words and expressions used by the parties in the
contract must be given full force and· effect, unless to do leads to an .absurdity or is contrary
to the manifest purpose and intention of the
parties."
And again:
"The best construction is that 'vhich is 1nade
by viewing the subject of the contract, as the 1nass
of mankind would view it; for it 1nay be safely
assu1ned that such 'vas the aspect in which the
parties themselves viewed it. A result thus obtained is exactly what is obtained from the cardinal rule of .intention." Schuylkill, etc., Co. v.
Moore, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 490.
It would be establishing an absurdity to construe
the contract between the parties in the instant case
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so as to cornpel appellants to accept the end result of
respondent's unilateral, successive efforts to cut plans
to an agreed figure. Certainly the fact that appellants
had consented to one effort cannot mean that they had
cornn1itted thernselves to a course of continuous consents
to continuing cutting.
\\Thile the facts are not precisel~r in point, the la'v
as stated in Vin,al v. Inhabitants, Etc. (:~I ass. 1919) 122
N.E. 29% see1ns pertinent .and applicable:
"It could not have been ruled as a matter of
la\V that the plaintiff \VUS entitled to an opportunity to n1odify his plans to the end that the cost
of the building might be brought within the specified arnount. It was an express terrn of his contract-that the test of his right to receive conlpens.ation should be bills received after advertisernent."
And we quote 6 C.J.S. 310 on the question of opportunity to perform:
"\Vhere Plaintiff \vas to prepare plans for a
building for which the construction bids were not
to exceed a fixed arnount, and where bids received
exceedPd that a1nount, Plaintiff was not entitled
later to rnodify his plans and bring the cost \vi thin
the limit."
CONCLlTSION

The rules of construction are applied to contracts
only when there are obvious ambiguities and never when
the contract is rlear in all its ter1ns. However, if \Ve \vere
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to concede simply for the purpose of argument that there
were any ambiguities in the contract, then there is
nothing \vhich could conceivably be construed as requiring appellants to accept the result of respondent's repeated efforts to change the plans and specifications.
The prim.ary rnotivation in seeking an architect to
design a home is that one may have a home to fit his own
ideas of comfortable and contented living. It is essentially the desires and the -wants of the 0\Yner that are to he
incorporated in a ho1ne, and it is the responsibility of th~
architect to fulfill those desires and \v.ants.
Here it is clear that the architect did so at the point
.,vhere l1e sent the plans and specifications out for the
first bids. It is also clear that he \Yas a\vare of a cost
limitation because it is beyond the credibility of a reasonable n1an ·to believe that an architect could be turned
loose to design a hon1e "Tith no n1ore restriction than
the respondent here clain1s and \Yithout a cost limitation.
The authorities clearly establish the fact that the
respondent, under the circumstances, owed to the appellants high duty o~ trust and responsibility; that the relationship between the parties \Yas such as to ilnpose
upon the respondent a duty to keep the appellants fully
infor1ned concerning his honest judg1nent as to cost,
and the amount of bids received pursuant to the plans
and specifications prep.ared by the respondent. 'Vhen
bids "Tere received for the \York, and ""rere greatly in
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excess of the arnount 'vhich respondent knew appellants
·were 'villing and able to pay for the construction of the
ho1ne in question, it becan1e his obligation to infor1n the
appellants of the arnount of Ruch bjd or hids.
\Vhen at the trial it heeante apparent that the respondent could not recover under the agreement which
had been entered into by respondent and· appellants it
'vas rlearly error for the court to per1nit respondent to
:.unend his pleadings in order to recover on the basis
of quantum 1neruit for any work performed in the preparation of the plans .and specifications. But assuming
that the eourt 'vas clothed 'vith the authority to per1nit
the case to proceed on the basis of a recovery on the
theory of a quanturn meruit, we subn1it that there is no
evidence in this record showing or purporting to show
the value of

~espondent's

services in the preparation of

the plans and specific.a tions to the point

whe~e

he ack-

nowledges a cost limitation.
The value of respondent's serv1ces was attempted
to be fixed by the court on the basis of a percentage of
the prestipulated liinitation cost of the work.

"\Ve subrnit that the appellants are entitled to a judgment of this court reversing the decision of the lower
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court with instruction to the lower court to enter judgment against the respondent for the sum of $1300.00
paid by appellants to respondent together with the legal
rate of interest from the date of entry of such judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

BERNARD L. ROSE,
A. H. HOUGAARD
Attorneys for Appellants
405 Felt Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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